of Article 218(9) TFEU might apply meaning that there would be no ratification 48 requirement, no parliamentary participation implied. 8 Thus, generally speaking, procedural issues. By virtue of Arts. 8.44.2 and 8.44.3(b), the Committee on Services and Investment establishes a code of conduct for the tribunal members that may address issues of disclosure, confidentiality, impartiality and independence, and procedural and transparency rules. The parties' role as such is to complete their respective internal requirements and procedures. 13 For example, the joint CETA committee may change the number of investment tribunal members (Art. 8.27.3), settle their salary (Art. 8.27.15), decide the list of arbitrators (Art. 29.8), or remove a member from the tribunal (Art. 8.30.4). Art. 10.5.2(b) grants the competence to exchange and adopt common criteria and interpretations for the implementation of Chapter 10 on temporary entry and residence for business purposes to the contact points of both sides, i.e. the Canadian Immigration Director and the EU Director General for Trade. 14 See the competences of the financial services committee in Annex 13-B CETA. 15 Art. 11.3 CETA on mutual recognition of professional qualifications. Those agreements are negotiated in a specific procedure provided in Art. 11.3.3-11.3.6 CETA and finally adopted by decision of the MRA Committee, whose binding force is conditional upon subsequent notification to the MRA Committee by each Party of the fulfilment of its respective internal requirements. The negotiations are conducted by each Party. 16 Under Art. 20.22.1, read in conjunction with Article 26.1.5(c), the CETA joint committee may, by amending Annex 20-A, add or remove protected geographical indications of origin. The joint management committee shall amend the Annexes to Chapter 5 (Art. 5.14.2(d)) (explicitly subject to approval by the parties in accordance with their procedures necessary for the entry into force of the amendment). See also Art. 20.22.1 in combination with Art. 26.1.5(c) CETA. For this classification see Bradley and Kelly, supra n. 3, p. 10. 17 The Committee on Trade in Goods endorses the implementation measures, Art. 21.7.5 CETA. 18 Under Art. 6.14.4, in conjunction with Art. 2.8.4 CETA, the joint Customs Cooperation Committee can resolve customs issues raised by a Party. the parties. 114 The binding force of decisions can be inferred from several circumstances. First, 115 CETA distinguishes between decisions and recommendations (see e.g. Articles 26.1.4(e), 116 26.1.5(f) and 26.3.2). Second, any decision adopted by a committee will cease to be 19 Art. 5.14.1: regulatory and trade representatives that bear responsibility for sanitary and phytosanitary measures; Art. 6.14.2: representatives of customs, commercial or other competent authorities; Art. 13.18.1: representatives of financial services authorities; Art. 19.19.1 makes a general reference to representatives of the contracting parties; Art. 21.6.3: the Forum for Regulatory Cooperation is jointly chaired by senior representatives of Canada and the Commission, while the other members can be 'relevant officials of each Party' which might include national representatives of the EU Member States. establishes specific, simplified procedures for agreeing to international rules in its 144 paragraphs 7 and 9. Article 218(9) TFEU provides, inter alia, that the Council, 145 again acting on a Commission proposal, adopts the position to be taken by the EU 146 in a treaty body. In the case of simplified amendments to be adopted by a 147 committee, Article 218(7) TFEU establishes an even more simplified procedure it is the committees' decisions that, in the view of the European Court of Justice, 27 The provisional application of CETA as from 21 September 2017 does not comprise those Committee competences which are enshrined in CETA Chapter 8, see Art. 1 Council Decision 2017/38, 2017 OJ L 11/1080 and the notice concerning the provisional application of the CETA, 2017 OJ L 238/9. Hence, the present analysis applies to them once they enter into force. 28 The evolutionary history would militate in favour of this, see the exploration of the ECJ case law in Appel, supra n. 21, p. 328. 29 In favour of the latter see A. legal effect in international agreements as Article 216 (2) is an exercise of public power. provisions. 45 As shown, the decision-making powers of CETA committees go 336 beyond purely technical issues and comprise legislative and regulatory functions. 43 Cf Lavranos, supra n. 34, p. 60; Appel, supra n. 21, p. 384 ff. 44 This is in line with the maximalist enforcement paradigm of the ECJ as regards EU Agreements, see Mendez, supra n. 41, p. 157. The binding force for the member states of a treaty-body decision established by a mixed agreement does not depend on the adoption of implementing measures, see Taflan-Met, supra n. 1, para. 19-22. 45 Recently, ECJ 25 October 2017, Case C-687/15, European Commission v Council ECLI:EU: C:2017:803, para. 48-49 confirmed the constitutional significance of respecting the principle of allocation of powers also with regard to international action of the EU.
The explicit competence of the EU to establish decision-making treaty bodies 338 in free trade agreements is rather sparsely indicated, although it is implied by 339 Article 218 (9) and provided for by Article 218(7) TFEU. which are instead subject to the ordinary treaty making procedure. 96 In 
